Writing at Wired.com, Bruce Schneier makes a counterintuitive but
fascinating
argument that draws on an academic paper by Max Abrahms titled "Why
Terrorism
Does Not Work." As Schneier sums it up, people have a "cognitive bias"
that
leads them to an erroneous conclusion about the motives of terrorists:
Because terrorism often results in the horrific deaths of innocents,
we mistakenly infer that the horrific deaths of innocents is the
primary motivation of the terrorist, and not the means to a
different end...
[Abrahms] analyzes the political motivations of 28 terrorist
groups: the complete list of "foreign terrorist organizations"
designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001. He lists 42
policy objectives of those groups, and found that they only achieved
them 7 percent of the time... Terrorism is a pretty ineffective
means of influencing policy. . . .
This theory explains, with a clarity I have never seen before,
why so many people make the bizarre claim that al Qaeda
terrorism--or Islamic terrorism in general--is "different": that
while other terrorist groups might have policy objectives, al
Qaeda's primary motivation is to kill us all. This is something
we have heard from President Bush again and again--Abrams [sic]
has a page of examples in the paper--and is a rhetorical staple
in the debate...
Since Bin Laden caused the death of a couple of thousand people
in the 9/11 attacks, people assume that must have been his actual
goal, and he's just giving lip service to what he claims are his
goals. Even Bin Laden's actual objectives are ignored as people
focus on the deaths, the destruction and the economic impact.
Perversely, Bush's misinterpretation of terrorists' motives
actually helps prevent them from achieving their goals.
What's really perverse, though, is the conclusion that Schneier draws from
all
this:
None of this is meant to either excuse or justify terrorism. In
fact, it does the exact opposite, by demonstrating why terrorism
doesn't work as a tool of persuasion and policy change. But we're
more effective at fighting terrorism if we understand that it is a
means to an end and not an end in itself; it requires us to
understand the true motivations of the terrorists and not just
their particular tactics. And the more our own cognitive biases
cloud that understanding, the more we mischaracterize the threat
and make bad security trade-offs.
But wait. According to Schneier, terrorism doesn't work because our
cognitive
biases cloud our understanding. If we developed a clearer understanding,
in
this view, we would focus more on terrorists' stated goals. Surely this
would,
at least in some cases, lead us to accede to terrorists' demands so as to
appease them.
Result: Terrorism would have a higher success rate. Surely this would not
escape the notice of people with political grievances, who would become
more
likely to employ terrorism to realize their goals. If indeed what Schneier
offers is clarity, it is accompanied by the strongest argument we've ever
heard for opacity.
--
Conservatives saw the savagery of 9/11 and the attacks and prepared for
war;
liberals saw the savagery of the 9/11 attacks and wanted to prepare
indictments and offer therapy and understanding for our attackers.
|
